Just a few years after the US Treasury announced the first sanction on two Bitcoin addresses, 398 more addresses entered the list. Thus, the number of addresses under the sanction reached 400.
The number of Bitcoin addresses under the sanctions is increasing
OpenSanctions uses over 50 sources to track sanctioned assets. Koindeks.comAs we have reported, according to the latest report, the number of Bitcoin addresses under sanction has reached 400.
For example, the address ‘3Lpoy53K625zVeE47ZasiG5jGkAxJ27kh1’, which OpenSanctions claims is related to GARANTEX EUROPE, an Estonian and Russian affiliate, is on OFAC’s black list.
This is an address that we randomly selected from the middle of hundreds of addresses. It is somewhat unclear how they named these invalid anonymous Bitcoin addresses. We have not checked the accuracy of this information. But their code is open source on GitHub. This way, anyone can verify it. The only crypto resource listed is ransomwhe.re, a site that collects addresses known to have contacted ransomware payments.
This breed is tracking an incredible 7,508 ransomware theft addresses. This makes it a potential data mine, especially for applications and exchanges alike. But they don’t list any random resource like ChainAnalysis. As such, the confirmed Bitcoin addresses come directly from the Treasury, possibly the identifier attribution, with OpenSanctions potentially acting as more aggregators.
Yet the public, while anonymous, the nature of Bitcoin clearly gives way to more complex systems that track money. If the address is flagged by these systems and not the network, it could potentially be a hassle to commit crypto misdemeanors in the future, as it could be frozen by everything else. However, it is possible for Bitcoin to still move. For example, a certified Russian entity might transfer cryptocurrencies to a pure third party in Russia, China, or India.
For example, the address mentioned above moved their Bitcoins. However, they sent it to an address that received 343 Bitcoins, even though its final balance is now zero. This one is quite different. Moving from here is riskier in terms of detecting guilt. If this 3EV address were a module of sanctions and said it wasn’t OpenSanctions, then it would be easy as any random transfer would be checked on suspicion as to whether it was innocent. However, now it is necessary to determine this somehow.
It is necessary to take into account the very fast-moving nature of Bitcoin
As you can imagine, nothing is outputting at this 3EV address. So we have no idea who he is. It is possible for exchanges or companies that specialize in blockchain analysis to do this. But more than once they probably won’t. Many of the transfers made from this address are also for very small sizes. However, with one of the transfers and only two hops, we reach a very large address. The best thing about it is that this 13x address also has a final nothingness stability. Continuing from here is a bit more interesting with some small addresses under 1,000 BTC.
At this point, however, we are a long way from where we started. Some confirmatory proof is needed that any of these last addresses has something to do with the address on the list. All indicate that you can confirm the address. But can you confirm Bitcoin? Also, would it be counterproductive to publish the addresses in this list instead of a semi-characteristic special list for exchanges?
Because at the network level you can’t fully implement anything. For this reason, moving the old system to the new one without making any changes may be beneficial on the surface. But it actually misses a lot of nuances. When it comes to this specially approved address, it is necessary to take into account the very fast-moving nature of Bitcoin. I need a new system for this. For example, it’s clear that the sanction doesn’t quite work. After all, it is easy to lose track of some movements of cryptocurrencies.